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Spectrum
Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons (89Kb) (with
Dave Farber)
Forthcoming, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference Proceedings, 2003 This is our contribution to the policy debate regarding appropriate mechanisms for allocating radio spectrum. It has attracted quite a bit of attention and controversy; I presented this work at several fora of the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force in 2002.
Bottlenecks
and Bandwagons: Access Policy in the New Telecommunicatons (84Kb)
Forthcoming, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vogelsang and Cave, eds., 2004. A more thorough reprise on access issues, particularly as they apply to telecommunications. This is likely my final word on the subject...maybe.
Access
¹ Access1
+ Access2 (89Kb)
Published in The Law Review of Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law, 677, 2002. A piece I did for the Quello Center at Michigan State on access issues. My point here is that there are two kinds of access, which are very different and need to be handled differently by regulators and antitrust enforcers.
Access
and Network Effects in a "New Economy Merger: AOL-Time Warner
(84Kb)
Forthcoming, The Antitrust Revolution, Kwoka and White, eds., 2003. Here's where I do a full review of the case, including both the FCC and the FTC, with a critical comparison of both.
Network Effects
and Merger Analysis: Instant Messaging and the AOL-Time Warner Case
(161 Kb)
Published in Telecommunications Policy, Jun/Jul 2002, 26, 311-333 The merger of AOL and Time Warner, announced in January 2000, is the largest merger ever consummated in corporate history. The merger case was considered by both the FTC and the FCC, the latter while I was Chief Economist. I was the architect of the economic case for placing restrictions on the merger relating to Instant Messaging. This paper analyzes the case and presents the arguments for and against an Instant Messaging condition. It also includes an economic model of network effects in a growing market, and carefully defines what tipping means and how one tests for it.
Policy-Induced
Competition: The Telecommunications Experiments (221 Kb)
Forthcoming, Information Economics and Policy, 2003 The 1996 Telecoms Act mandated the Regional Bell Operating Companies "unbundle" their local loop (the last natural monopoly/essential facility) in order to accelerate local competition in telephony. The experiment has so far not been a rousing success. I look at the three previous occasions in which policymakers attempted to open part of the telecoms market to competition, with mixed success. I hypothesize, based on this record, conditions necessary to achieve competition; I test this hypothesis using a natural experiment involving intrastate intra-LATA toll calling vs. inter-LATA toll calling. Guess what? This latest attempt is going to fail.
Broadband Deployment:
Is Policy in the Way?
(64 Kb)
Forthcoming, Brookings Conference Proceedings, 2003 After years of delay, broadband services that connect homes to the Internet are finally rolling out. However, some has called the pace of this rollout "disappointing". The Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), who are deploying DSL, a broadband technology, have claimed that FCC regulations are a cause of this slow deployment, arguing that these regulations reduce their broadband investments incentive. In this paper, I examine the pace of the broadband rollout relative to the historical deployment pace of other popular electronic products and services; I find that broadband is being deployed at least as fast as recently introduced products and services. I also examine the hypothesis that government regulation has impeded broadband deployment. I find there is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis and a number of factors that suggest otherwise. Finally, I make recommendations of actions regulators and legislators could take that are likely to have a significant impact on the pace of broadband deployment.
Information, Disinformation
and Lobbying in a Median Voter Model (137 Kb)
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The third (and probably last) in a series of papers on Political Economy. This addresses a way in which lobbying and political action can change how people vote (as opposed to just getting out the vote). I started and completed this work during my 6 week stay at the Institut Analisi Economica in Barcelona, Spain, so thanks, guys, for the financial support and some interesting colleagues.
Emerging Technologies
and Public Policy: Lessons from the Internet (120
Kb)
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I was asked to write a chapter on the role of public policy in emerging technologies by my Wharton colleagues editing "Wharton on Emerging Technologies" . It was rather straightforward to compile a list of ways in which government affects technology development and deployment. However, when I decided to do an extended case study of public policy and the Internet, I was quite surprised to find what a success story the Internet has been for government. It's enough to make a free-marketeer sit up and take notice.
Lobbying,
Voting, and the Political Economy of Price Regulation (137Kb)
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My previous voting paper captured much of the political aspects of regulation, but missed a critical piece of the puzzle: lobbying. In this paper, I develop a model of lobbying, voting, and price-setting, and test whether the Becker effect (lobbying increases the efficiency of political outcomes) is outweighed by the Posner effect (lobbying is resource-consuming, and its cost is likely greater than efficiency gains).
The
Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications (261 Kb)
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This is joint work with Christiaan Hogendorn, a doctoral student in the Public Policy and Management Department. Nice game-theoretic model of an important public policy question, calibrated with engineering data.
Public
Policy for a Networked Nation (79 Kb)
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This article has just appeared in the The University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 8, 1997, 219-242. It discusses policy options and likely outcomes for the deployment of interactive broadband networks needed for the coming Information Infrastructure.
Voting
on Prices: The Political Economy of Regulation(137 Kb)
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This is my attempt to bring a whiff of politics into the analysis of regulatory pricing, a field that in my view has been dominated by elegant economics with a tenuous connection to what actually motivates regulators. It is to be published in Interconnection and The Internet: Selected Papers from the 1996 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 1997, ed. Greg Rosston and David Waterman (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ).
Banking
Markets: Productivity, Risk, and Customer Satisfaction(188 Kb)
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This research developed from a relationship with Deloitte & Touche and was extended with a two-year grant from the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. I am currently updating the study with the able assistance of Eslyn Jean-Baptiste, a doctoral student in Public Policy & Management. The presentation overheads for the seminar are available in my Talks and Tuturials Page.
Public
Policy in Telecommunications: The Third Revolution(106 Kb)
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This research grew out of my renewed interest in telecommunications, which now seems to be pretty exciting (after a decade of being really boring). This paper was published in Information Economics and Policy, 7 (1995), 251-282.
Markets
vs. Governments: The Political Economy of NIMBY(91 Kb)
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This paper is joint with Dan Ingberman, currently at Washington University at St. Louis. It is published in Roger D. Congleton, ed., The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. It is my one (and probably only) foray into environmental economics.
Pricing
the Internet: the Efficient Subsidy(107
Kb)
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This paper was written for a conference in 1990, and published
in B. Kahin, ed., Building Information Infrastructure,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. It is "pre-Web", and certainly
pre-Mosaic/Netscape. It was one of the earliest papers by an economist
on the Internet; think of it as a period piece.
Replaced
missing figures.